S
tate and local governments are often responsible for disbursing federal medical, educational, and welfare beneits. What happens when they deny or revoke them unfairly? Some recipients have used 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a way to enforce the underlying statutes. The Supreme Court decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) , made this more dificult. In doing so, the Court adopted stringent rules for the use of § 1983 to enforce any federal laws, including the nation's civil rights laws.
In Gonzaga, John Doe sued his university for disclosing embarrassing disciplinary records to unauthorized third parties in violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. He sought to enforce FERPA through § 1983. The Supreme Court rejected the suit, holding that FERPA did not establish an individual right enforceable through § 1983. The majority opinion adopted a rule that spending legislation that provides federal funding to various state actors does not ordinarily create individual enforceable rights under § 1983 unless Congress demonstrates through "clear and unambiguous terms" that it intends to provide individual rights against a state actor that accepts federal funding." While previous cases had distinguished between implied-right-of-action cases, where evidence of congressional intent to provide a private remedy is required, and § 1983 cases, where a remedy is generally presumed, the majority essentially treated these two types of statutes as similarly requiring evidence of congressional intent. In doing so, the majority applied the stricter standard of implied right of action cases to § 1983, thus weakening the power of § 1983.
Gonzaga is better understood in light of prior decisions deining implied rights of action and § 1983 suits. From 1964 until the late 1970s, the Supreme Court and lower courts found implied private causes of action under several statutes. However, more recent Supreme Court decisions have made it more dificult for courts to infer that a statute establishes an implied private right by requiring signiicant evidence of congressional intent to create a private right of action. For instance, the Court in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act because neither § 602's language nor subsequent amendments to Title VI demonstrated congressional intent to establish a private cause of action to enforce § 602. Because the Court increasingly rejected implied private rights of action, plaintiffs instead turned to § 1983 suits to enforce statutory rights that do not contain explicit remedies.
Before 1980, the Supreme Court had only clearly allowed § 1983 suits in cases alleging violations of constitutional rights. During the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted statutes establishing federal grant-in-aid programs to states and also used these state programs to provide funds to individual welfare beneiciaries. In 1980, the Supreme Court in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) , held that the plain meaning of the term "and laws" in § 1983 referred to federal statutory rights and allowed private individuals who were beneiciaries of those rights to bring suit. However, judges concerned with protecting states' rights against what they perceived as intrusive federal suits sought to limit Thiboutot's scope. Additionally, some judges may have been concerned that § 1983 suits allowed plaintiffs to evade the Court's increasingly narrow view of implied rights of action. Until the Gonzaga decision, the Court's decisions wavered between broad and narrow readings of Thiboutot.
The Gonzaga decision adopted a restrictive approach to use of § 1983 suits to require states to provide welfare beneits and other rights to individuals pursuant to federal funding statutes. The Court emphasized that § 1983 suits may only enforce clear statutory rights and may not be used to enforce vaguer beneits or interests, even if some earlier Court decisions had suggested otherwise. The majority argued that the test for determining whether rights are enforceable in § 1983 suits is whether there is clear and unambiguous evidence of a right-an inquiry similar to the one in private rights suits but without the requirement for evidence of congressional intent to create a private remedy. The Court stated that Congress must clearly establish its intent to create individual rights if it wishes to alter the balance between states and the federal government. In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the majority's requirement of clear textual evidence that Congress intended to establish an individual right inappropriately adopted the test used in implied-right-of-action cases, namely, whether Congress intended to establish a private remedy. He contended that the majority had acknowledged that this requirement was unnecessary in § 1983 cases because that statute allows private enforcement of any statute creating a distinct federal right, even if there is no private right of action under the substantive statute. Although the majority opinion asserted that it was not importing the entire implied-rightof-action framework into the § 1983 arena, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's approach effectively did just that and undermined the "presumptive enforceability of rights under § 1983."
Despite not explicitly changing the existing three-part enforcement test for § 1983, the Gonzaga decision imposes a signiicant burden of proof on plaintiffs by requiring unambiguous and explicit evidence that Congress intended to create an individual right beneiting a class including the plaintiff. Although proposing to determine only whether Congress intended to create an individual right, the majority in fact blurred the distinction between rights and remedies by improperly considering in a § 1983 case whether Congress intended to create a cause of action. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Gonzaga arguably weakened civil liberties by undermining the principle that federal statutory rights are presumptively enforceable through § 1983's express provision for enforcement of statutory rights. In exceptional cases, a defendant can rebut the presumption that all federal rights are enforceable through § 1983. However, a defendant has the burden of demonstrating that Congress has speciically foreclosed enforcement under § 1983 or that a statute provides comprehensive remedies incompatible with § 1983. By blurring the line between rights and remedies, the majority effectively shifted the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff to demonstrate that § 1983 may be used to enforce and provide a remedy for a federal statutory right.
The Gonzaga case claims to clarify when federal statutory rights may be enforced by § 1983. However, the majority opinion actually did not clarify how courts should determine what is "clear" and "unambiguous" evidence of congressional intent to establish an individual right. It is unclear whether the majority's test requires a textualist approach or allows consideration of legislative history. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Gonzaga largely focused on the "text and structure" of the FERPA provisions directly at issue, although the Court briely considered one aspect of the statute's legislative history. Despite agreeing with the Gonzaga majority that whether private individuals may enforce a federal statute through § 1983 is "a question of congressional intent," Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter joined, concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the "majority's presumption that a right is conferred only if set forth 'unambiguously' in the statute's 'text and structure.'" The majority opinion never responded to Justice Breyer's claim that its approach was textualist. The Gonzaga decision provides little guidance on which types of evidence may be considered in determining congressional intent to confer an individual right to sue.
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Finally, in Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014 , the Court found that Secret Service agents were protected by qualiied immunity when they engaged in viewpoint discrimination with regard to speakers. In Oregon, Secret Service agents allowed supporters of President George W. Bush to be closer to him and pushed his opponents further away. The law under the First Amendment is clear that the government cannot discriminate among speakers based on their views unless strict scrutiny is met.
Nonetheless, the Court, in a unanimous decision with the majority opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, found that the Secret Service agents were protected by qualiied immunity because there were no cases on point concerning when Secret Service agents violate the First Amendment. But why must there be cases that speciic when the law is clearly established that viewpoint discrimination violates the First Amendment?
All of these cases were unanimous. All found qualiied immunity because of the absence of a case on point. Together, they show a Court that is very protective of government oficials who are sued for money damages and that has made it very dificult for victims of constitutional violations to recover.
Conclusion
Decisions about absolute and qualiied immunity receive little media attention. But these are enormously important doctrines that keep injured individuals from recovering. The promise of Marbury v. Madison-that "[t] he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury"-is rendered empty when absolute or qualiied immunity precludes any remedy. The Roberts Court has expanded both absolute and qualiied immunity and thus has undermined government accountability.
Introduction, from page 4 dificult to protect children than adults. As Fatima Goss Graves and Adaku Onyeka-Crawford explain in their article, employers are responsible if supervisors sexually harass employees. They are responsible if co-workers harass each other if the employer "knew or should have known" about the sexual harassment. Employers can't put their heads in the sand to avoid liability. Yet, that is exactly what schools can do under Title IX after Gebser and Davis.
Under the new test, a school is not responsible for sexual harassment or even assault against children unless the children provide the right authority igure with notice of the speciic harassment and the school responds with deliberate indifference, a high standard that lower courts are quick to ind does not exist even in the most egregious situations. Students must also explain how enduring the harassment denied them equal access to education. Why would the Court make it more dificult for children to demand protection and accountability in schools than adults receive in the workplace? Would the outcome have been different if more women had heard the cases?
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A inal critique of qualiied immunity is one that is dificult to prove empirically. Because of the many costs associated with this defense that I have identiied above, plaintiffs and their attorneys may ind that the game is not worth the candle. To prevail on a constitutional tort claim, which may not necessarily involve a large monetary recovery, the plaintiff must navigate the dificult path that the qualiied immunity doctrine has hewn. They may be tied down for years litigating qualiied immunity and defending multiple interlocutory appeals should they initially prevail on the qualiied immunity claim in the trial court. Even with the incentive of attorney fee shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, many plaintiffs may simply be discouraged from ever iling a constitutional tort claim because they anticipate that they will be drawn into a protracted and timeconsuming dispute. The suppression of potentially meritorious civil rights claims is a cost of qualiied immunity that impedes access to justice in profound and troubling ways. should they initially prevail on the qualiied immunity claim in the trial court. Even with the incentive of attorney fee shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, many plaintiffs may simply be discouraged from ever iling a constitutional tort claim because they anticipate that they will be drawn into a protracted and timeconsuming dispute. The suppression of potentially meritorious civil rights claims is a cost of qualiied immunity that impedes access to justice in profound and troubling ways. 
